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Abstract
This paper reviews recent research dealing with the relationships between economic
growth, income distribution, and poverty. This generally fails to find any systematic
pattern of change in income distribution during recent decades. Neither does it find any
systematic link from fast growth to increasing inequality. The level of initial income
inequality is not a robust explanatory factor of growth, but some recent empirical studies
have found a negative impact of asset inequality on growth. Possible channels are credit
rationing, reduced possibilities for participation in the political process, and social
conflicts. Among the strategic elements that have contributed to reduced poverty are: an
outward-oriented strategy of export-led growth, based on labour-intensive manufacturing;
agricultural and rural development, with encouragement of new technologies; investment
in physical infrastructure and human capital; efficient institutions that provide the right set
of incentives to farmers and entrepreneurs; and social policies to promote health,
education, and social capital, as well as safety nets to protect the poor. Countries that have
been successful in terms of economic growth are also very likely to have been successful in
reducing poverty. Growth can be substantial if the policy and institutional environment is
right.
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1. Introduction
The most important goal for development efforts is to reduce poverty, which can be
accomplished by economic growth and/or by income redistribution. This paper provides a
selective review of recent literature dealing with the relationships between economic
growth, income distribution, and poverty. It also discusses the effect of economic policies
on these three factors.
The concept of development has been debated for a long time, and has major philosophical
implications, which we will not discuss here (for a discussion, see Sen, 1989). What we are
concerned with is changes in the economic welfare of people, and also this has many
dimensions. We will concentrate on three dimensions of economic welfare, namely per
capita income, income distribution, and poverty.1 Income or consumption is bound to be an
important part of any discussion of the consequences of economic policies and reforms on
the poor. Economic reforms will be judged inter alia on their effect on gross domestic
product, and since both GDP and household income (consumption) are measured in
monetary terms, income (consumption) poverty-measures will provide a useful starting
point.
2. Aggregate trends in poverty and inequality
Both the global share of population (Table 1) and the absolute number of people living on
less than one (or two) dollar a day (Table 2) declined substantially in the mid 1990s, after
increasing earlier in the decade. The declines in the numbers are almost exclusively due to
a reduction in the number of poor people in East Asia, most notably in China. But progress
was partly reversed by the Asian financial crisis, or was at least stalled, as in China. In
South Asia, the incidence of poverty (the share of the population living in poverty) also
declined moderately through the 1990s, but not sufficiently to reduce the absolute number
of poor, which was rising steadily between 1987 and 1996. Also in Africa the share
declined (at least after 1993), while the numbers increased. The estimates indicate that
Africa is the region with the largest share of people living below $1/day. In Latin America,
the share of poor people remained roughly constant over the period, while the numbers
generally increased. In the countries of the former Soviet bloc, poverty rose markedly, both
as a share, and in numbers. One must note, however, the income distribution data are often
fragile and one must be cautious when interpreting them.2
Trends in inequality within countries show no overall pattern. Data up to the mid 1990s
shows increases in inequality in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and possibly in Africa,
but declines in South Asia, and not much change elsewhere.
1 To measure poverty one may use income or consumption data or various non-monetary measures (see
Dercon, 2000, or White, 1999).
2 The problems of interpreting Indian survey data are discussed in Srinivasan (2000), who also points out the
difficulties of making valid cross-country comparisons.2
Table 1
Headcount index, selected years, 1987-98
Regions Percentage of population living on less than $1 a day
1987 1990 1993 1996 1998(est.)
East Asia and the Pacific 26.6 27.6 25.2 14.9 15.3
(excluding China) 23.9 18.5 15.9 10.0 11.3
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.2 1.6 4.0 5.1 5.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 15.3 16.8 15.3 15.6 15.6
Middle East and North Africa 4.3 2.4 1.9 1.8 1.9
South Asia 44.9 44.0 42.4 42.3 40.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 46.6 47.7 49.7 48.5 46.3
Total 28.3 29.0 28.1 24.5 24.0
(excluding China) 28.5 28.1 27.7 27.0 26.2
Source: Chen and Ravallion (forthcoming).
Table 2
Population (millions) living on less than $1 per day, selected years 1987-98
Region 1987 1990 1993 1996 1998(est.)
East Asia and the Pacific 417.5 452.4 431.9 265.1 278.3
(excluding China) 114.1 92.0 83.5 55.1 65.1
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 1.1 7.1 18.3 23.8 24.0
Latin America and the Caribbean 63.7 73.8 70.8 76.0 78.2
Middle East and North Africa 9.3 5.7 5.0 5.0 5.5
South Asia 474.4 495.1 505.1 531.7 522.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 217.2 242.3 273.3 289.0 290.9
Total 1183.2 1276.4 1304.4 1190.6 1198.9
(excluding China) 879.8 916.0 956.0 980.6 985.7
Source: Chen and Ravallion (forthcoming).
World inequality is mainly driven by differences between countries. When measuring
inequality in terms of per capita GDP converted to dollars at official exchange rates,
inequality has risen over the long haul. According to UNDP (1999) the ratio of income per
capita in the richest country over that in the poorest country has increased from eleven in
1913, to thirty-five in 1950, then to forty-four by 1973; and seventy-two by 1992. It is thus
obvious that some countries were left behind, as the now developed countries took off.
However, is this the most appropriate way to measure the gaps. Melchior, Telle, and Wiig
(2000) have attempted to check more thoroughly what has happened to international
inequality since 1960. In contrast to the UNDP they use PPP weighted estimates of per
capita incomes of 115 countries, and they also weight the countries by population size.
This means that development in China weighs heavily in the results. Their estimates of the
Gini-coefficients for differences in average per capita incomes suggest that international
inequality has actually been falling more or less continuously since 1968. Their results are
consistent with those of Sprout and Weaver (1992), Schultz (1998), Firebaugh (1999), and
Boltho and Toniolo (1999) up to 1990. Also the study by Melchior, Telle and Wiig show3
increasing international inequality until 1994, when official exchange rates are used, but
for the period 1994-7 even that measure shows a declining trend. They then use the Lorenz
curve to investigate what has happened to various percentiles. It is then shown that the
share of the bottom ten per cent did decline, but for the bottom twenty per cent or any
higher share, it increased. The increasing gap between 1982 and 1997 between the top and
the bottom deciles mainly reflects the decline in poor countries in Africa. These estimates
neglect intra-country inequality, and Milanovic (1999) has incorporated this effect as well
for the limited period of 1988-93. For this period he then found that world inequality did
increase. We have noted, however, that it has been hard to find any systematic pattern in
within-country inequality over longer periods of time, so his results may not be typical.
Even if income differences are not generally increasing, inter-country gaps in per capita
incomes are enormous, and a major explanation of world inequality. It is also serious that
that the very poorest countries are falling further and further behind.
3. Determinants of growth
While linkages between growth, income distribution, and poverty will be discussed later,
we will elaborate a bit on the determinants of growth. We should keep in mind, though,
that there are many factors that influence economic growth, not all easily quantifiable.
Early analyses of economic growth were usually done within the framework of the
neoclassical growth model, as developed by Solow (1956) and others. Driven by
diminishing returns to capital, this model implies convergence, meaning that the lower the
starting level of per capita income, the higher the rate of growth, with the economy
converging to a steady state level. This presupposes that countries are alike except for the
initial capital-labour ratio, but in reality they may of course differ in many other
dimensions.
In the neoclassical model, the steady-state per capita income level attained depends on the
propensity to save and the position of the production function, and these factors may vary
across countries. If there is technical progress, the steady state income level will gradually
increase. Barro (1997) notes that the steady state also depends on government policies, for
example with regard to public consumption, protection of property rights, and distortions
of domestic and international markets. The concept of capital in the standard model may be
extended to include human capital in the form of education, experience, and health. The
endogenous growth literature, starting with Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), suggests that
growth may go on indefinitely, since returns to investment in human capital, for example,
need not be diminishing: External effects of human capital and spillovers between
producers help economies avoid diminishing returns to capital. However, the expensive in-
house research and development that manufacturing firms undertake in advanced industrial
economies is usually not possible in countries in the early stages of industrialization. Then
less developed economies will have to grow a by accumulating physical and human
capital, and increasing specialization by industry (Peretto, 1999).
There is a well-known result in the empirical literature, that there is no direct correlation
between the initial level of per capita income and the rate of growth, which means that
there is no unconditional convergence. However, when other relevant variables are added
to the model, there is an effect. There is convergence, but conditional on these other
variables, which vary across countries. Barro's (1997) cross-country study shows that
variables that matter for growth are, for example, the initial level of per capita income, the4
initial level of human capital, the fertility rate, government consumption, the rule of law,3
terms of trade, and the investment ratio. Thus, it is far from self-evident that a country will
grow fast just because it starts out poor. It could be that, because of poor policies or other
conditions, it grows only slowly, or even converges to a low-level steady state. Sub-
Saharan Africa might be a case in point.
It is clear that per capita incomes in the long term are determined by the levels of human
capital and physical capital, and the underlying level of productivity as shown in a standard
aggregate production function. But this type of formulation leads on to further questions:
What determines the levels of investment in human and physical capital, and what
determines productivity growth? A recent attempt to discuss these issues is due to Hall and
Jones (1999), who present a cross-country analysis of per capita income levels with the
very simple basic hypothesis, that per capita income levels are indirectly determined by the
amount of ‘social infrastructure’. By social infrastructure they mean the institutions and
government policies that determine the economic environment, within which individuals
accumulate skills and firms accumulate capital and produce output. The environment
should thus support productive activities and encourage capital accumulation, skill
acquisition, and technology transfer. Such an infrastructure must limit diversion and get
prices right, so that individuals can capture the returns to their actions as private economic
agents. Social control of diversion, which is a major component of ‘social infrastructure’,
has two benefits: Producers are allowed to reap the full rewards of their production, and
they do not need to invest resources in avoiding diversion. The government should
therefore try to prevent private diversion, and should refrain from diverting itself.
Rentseeking can have a very negative effect on growth (Bigsten and Moene, 1996).
This analysis thus says that social infrastructure determines the underlying level of
productivity, which then influences output per worker, and suggests that one should
distinguish between the proximate causes of growth, such as human and physical capital
accumulation, and the more fundamental determinants of productivity. Hall and Jones note
that social infrastructure is an endogenous variable, and they therefore use instrumental
variables to control for this, geographic and linguistic variables that show how much the
countries have been influenced by Western Europe. Even controlling for this, they find that
social infrastructure explains most of the differences in per capita incomes. They conclude
that differences in physical capital and educational attainment explain only a modest
amount of the difference in output per worker across countries. Further, it is rather
differences in the underlying production function that explain the vast differences in per
capita incomes.
As proxies for social infrastructure, Hall and Jones used an index of government anti-
diversion policies, plus an index of the extent to which a country is open to international
trade. Openness gives scope for specialization, but it also facilitates the adoption of new
ideas and technologies. Growth problems have been most pronounced in countries that
have pursued an inward-oriented policy. Opening up to international markets is therefore
essential.
3 Barro uses an indictor from the International Country Risk Guide reflecting the quality of the bureaucracy,
political corruption, likelihood of government repudiation of contracts, risk of government expropriation, and
overall maintenance of the rule of law.5
Countries with a good social infrastructure, then, have high capital intensities, high human
capital per worker, and high productivity. These differences, interpreted through an
aggregate production function, are able to account for the variation in output per worker.
Thus, the results of Hall and Jones suggest that success in investment and productivity
growth is driven by social infrastructure, as reflected in institutions and government
policies. However, it should be noted that the results are not based on properly estimated
production functions. The capital coefficient, for example is just assumed to be one third,
which is too low for Africa. The returns to education in Africa taken from Psacharopoulos
(1994) are much too high. Recent empirical estimates suggests that returns to primary
education in Africa are very close to zero rather than the 13 percent which are used. The
empirical estimates in the paper are thus debatable, but the general drift of their arguments
seems very relevant.
One may conclude that the accumulation of physical and human capital, efficiency in
resource allocation, and acquisition and application of modern technology are necessary
for growth. The key question is how the policy environment should be organised in order
for it to facilitate the accumulation of production factors and their efficient allocation, as
well as the introduction of enhanced technologies. Economic policies at the micro level
should clearly aim to develop and sustain efficient markets, while macro policy should be
geared towards guaranteeing macroeconomic stability, and towards openness. It has also
become increasingly clear that a supportive environment of efficient institutions is crucial
for the functioning of the economy. Such institutions can lower transaction costs, while
raising the supply of information and services to economic actors. In the African
economies, for example, uncertainty is high, thus hindering the expansion of economic
transactions, and reducing the scope for specialization. The general uncertainty of property
rights dissuades economic actors from entering into long term contracts, and thus
constrains large investments in fixed capital: Given incomplete markets for capital goods,
fixed investments might be irreversible, and actors want to guard themselves against this
eventuality.
What then is required for growth-supporting institutions to develop? It is not enough to
instil the relevant skills in civil servants, only to put them into institutions where outsiders
determine outcomes. A government primarily concerned with its own survival will not
necessarily set up the institutions and establish codes of conduct necessary for economic
growth. With special interest politics at centre stage, there is bound to be inefficiency,
which will make investors cautious, while elsewhere in the economy resources are wasted
on rentseeking activities.
The debate on the determinants of growth has increasingly come to focus on the political
economy of policy making. To be able to systematise the experiences of different
countries, one needs to have a classification scheme. In their large cross-country project,
Lal and Myint (1996) used a five-fold classification of countries by political environments
and a three-fold classification by economic structure, the latter based on their factor
proportions: Countries are classified as labour abundant, land abundant, or intermediate,
relative to the world endowments of labour, land, and capital. This classification makes it
possible to use the three-factor trade model developed by Krueger (1977) and Leamer
(1987) to discuss a whole range of different development paths. The paths depend on the
accumulation of capital and labour, and imply different patterns of change in functional
income distribution.6
The five-fold political classification distinguishes between the objectives of the
government and the constraints it faces. With regard to constraints, Lal and Myint
distinguished between the autonomous and the factional state. In the former, the state
works for its own ends. One might have a Platonic Guardian State, benevolently trying to
maximize some social welfare function, but alternatively, one might have a predatory state,
which either seeks to maximize the net revenue for the ruler's use or the bureaucratic state
maximizing public employment. The factional state, on the other hand, has no objectives of
its own, but tries to realize those of anyone who is able to capture the state. Here, Lal and
Myint distinguish between the oligarchic state and the majoritarian democracy.
Lal and Myint found that initial resource endowment was more important in determining
the policy outcome than the type of political system. Labour abundant countries, such as
Korea and Taiwan, had an easy policy making task and could follow the prescriptions from
the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, initially concentrating on labour-intensive production
and then moving up the ladder of comparative advantage as capital was accumulated. A
major reason why this development path is relatively smooth is that it leads to politically
desirable factor price changes, that is, increasing real wages as more capital is
accumulated. The bulk of the population will gain, and will thus not resist the policy in a
factional state. Also, the various types of autonomous states will find it in their interest to
pursue a development strategy that uses its abundant resource intensively.
The comparative advantage of natural resource abundant countries is also relatively
straightforward, but may be more difficult to realize. Lal (2000) gives several reasons:
First, with a higher supply-price of labour than in the labour abundant countries,
comparative advantage lies in more capital intensive types of production. Public
intervention may be required to realize bulky investments, develop specific skills, and
absorb advanced technology. This opens up the field for bureaucratic failures, which may
then undermine growth potential. The second point is that, if capital accumulation is not
fast enough, and with a rapidly growing labour force, the optimal development path may
imply falling real wages. In the case of factional government, this may lead to political
pressure to avoid this by turning inward; there may be swings between populist periods and
liberalization phases. Thirdly, to avoid the falling wages, many countries have attempted to
undertake big push development programmes, which have often been financed by foreign
borrowing leading to high indebtedness. Fourthly, given the rents available from the
natural resources, there has been extensive politicization of the distribution of these rents,
which has a severe effect on the rent generating sector, particularly when terms of trade
decline. It may be that the wealth of natural resources leads to a policy that destroys the
sector that generated the rents. See discussion of the case of Zambia in Bigsten and
Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2000.
The intermediate resource endowment countries face a more complex task. It is not as clear
what their incremental comparative advantage is; mistakes are not as easily observed. The
political system may also be at odds with the pursuit of their comparative advantage (see
Lal, 1995, on India and China).
Generally, Lal and Myint (1996) did not find any relationship between the form of
government and economic performance. Instead they found that it was the availability, or
lack, of natural resources, that was the major determinant of policies, which affected the
efficiency and volume of investment, and thus the rate of growth.7
4. Economic growth, income distribution and poverty
A pro-poor growth strategy does not have to only focus on economic growth, but could
also be combined with an active policy of income redistribution. However, there may be a
trade-off: If more rapid reduction in poverty can be achieved through reductions in
inequalities, then distributional policy takes on a greater priority; but on the other hand, if
greater levels of inequality appear to secure rapid growth leading to faster poverty
reduction, then there may well be greater tolerance of inequalities. Thus, the relationship
between growth and inequality are important from a policy perspective.
In his famous 1955 article, Simon Kuznets investigated the relationship between per capita
incomes and inequality in a cross-section of countries. He found that there was an inverted-
U pattern, that is, inequality first increased, and then decreased, as per capita income
increased. The driving force was assumed to be structural change in a dual economy
setting, in which labour was shifted from a poor and relatively undifferentiated traditional
sector, to a more productive and more differentiated, modern sector. Kuznets' inverted-U
has been exposed to a large number of tests over the years. Deininger and Squire (1998)
provide the most comprehensive attempt so far to test the Kuznets hypothesis. They used a
data set of better quality than previous researchers had, and for individual countries they
had fairly comparable data for several points in time. They were also able to examine the
income changes in the bottom quintiles, that is, among the poor. The result for their
sample, was that there was no evidence of an inverted-U pattern for individual countries. In
the majority of cases, in fact, it was impossible to find any significant change in income
distribution during recent decades. They then went on to investigate whether there was a
link from fast growth to increasing inequality, and again they did not find any systematic
evidence in favour of such a relationship. Rapid growth was associated with growing
inequality as often as it was associated with falling inequality, or with no changes at all.
The results are consistent with those of an earlier study by Ravallion and Chen (1997), who
did not find any systematic relationship between the rate of growth and inequality either.
This suggests that economic policy aimed at rapid growth is a vital ingredient in a strategy
to reduce poverty.
The impact of growth on the poor obviously depends on how the benefits are distributed
across the population. By looking at the growth and income shares of different groups,
Deininger and Squire (1998) investigated how initial inequality and contemporaneous
changes in inequality influence poverty. The poor (bottom 20 percent) were found to suffer
from growth reducing effects of inequality, and also to benefit from measures that
stimulate growth. Also Ravallion and Chen (1997) found a very strong relation from
growth to reduced poverty. They distributed their observations into four quadrants,
according to the direction of changes in mean consumption and in the poverty rate.
Virtually all observations fell either in the quadrants with rising poverty and falling mean
income or in the quadrant with falling poverty and rising mean incomes. Empirically, there
is thus a very strong relationship from per capita income growth to poverty reduction.4
Even if there is a strong relationship from GDP growth to poverty reduction it might be the
case that countries with initially severe inequality may be less successful at reducing
4 Other studies supporting positive effects of growth on poverty are Ravallion (1993), Ravallion and Datt
(1994), Bell and Rich (1994), and Dollar and Kraay (2000).8
poverty. While earlier models, such as the Harrod-Domar model, predicted that greater
inequality would lead to higher growth rates, there was, during the 1990s, a shift in focus
towards the opposite effect: Can greater inequality lead to a lower level of overall growth?
Some empirical evidence from both industrialized and less-developed countries has tended
to confirm the negative impact of inequality on growth. Such a relationship was found in
(admittedly somewhat shaky) cross-country data by Persson and Tabellini (1994), and also
by Alesina and Rodrik (1994). These authors interpreted the results in a political economy
context, their argument being that when inequality is high, the median voter will push for
high (distortionary) taxes on the better-off, which will have disincentive effects on efforts
and savings, which would then reduce growth. Further tests of this proposition have cast
some doubt on its validity, however, and the evidence for disincentive effects of taxation is
so far fairly weak. Another possible channel from inequality to growth is via social
conflicts. Alesina and Perotti (1996) argued that inequality leads to increased political
instability, which tends to reduce efficiency and investment levels, and then growth. It has
also been argued that instability reduces the ability of governments to respond to external
shocks (Rodrik, 1997).
Deininger and Squire tested the link from inequality to growth, but found no stable
relationship between the level of initial income inequality and growth. They found, though,
that high inequality in the distribution of land, proxying for asset distribution, had a
significantly negative effect on future growth.5 The main factor identified as a possible
explanation was credit rationing, in situations where investments are indivisible. It might
be impossible for the poor to finance schooling or other investments, even if they would be
profitable, since they lack collateral for loans. Lack of assets might also reduce possibilities
for participation in the political process, and thus also reduce access to resources. Once
countries become sufficiently rich, this link between high inequality and low growth seems
to disappear. Low initial inequality is thus doubly beneficial for the poor, since it not only
increases overall growth, but it also specifically increases their own income generating
opportunities. Other policy variables, however, affect poverty mainly through their effect
on investment, and investment in new assets seems more effective than redistribution of
existing ones. There may be problems with the use of a land reform policy to fight poverty
if it leads to reduced investments. Birdsall, Ross, Sabot (1995) found that the low
inequality of income in East Asia contributed to its fast growth. In addition, policies that
reduced poverty and income inequality, such as basic education and measures augmenting
labour demand, also stimulated growth.
The debate about how the empirical link between growth and inequality looks is not at all
finished, though. Forbes (2000) uses a method that makes it possible to allow for fixed
country effects to estimate how inequality in a given country effects its growth. She then
finds, contrary to earlier studies, a robust and significant positive relation between income
inequality and growth. Obviously there is need for further research on this issue before we
are too certain as to how the relationship looks.
One should not view the poor as a homogenous group, since one may then miss important
within-group changes in well-being. For example, the responsiveness of various measures
of poverty, to growth and to changes in distribution, differs between urban and rural areas.
5 Birdsall and Londono (1997) also found a strong relationship between growth and initial distribution of
assets.9
Using household survey data from 16 Sub-Saharan African countries, Ali and Thorbecke
(1998) provide evidence that rural poverty is more responsive to growth than is urban
poverty. Urban poverty seems to be more responsive to changes in income distribution
than rural poverty. While the incomes of the poorest are responsive to growth, this may
hide important dynamics among the poor.6 For example, in a rural household panel data
study from Sichuan covering the period 1991-5 McCulloch and Calandrino (2001) found
that most households that fall into poverty only stay there for one or two years. Although a
third of the poor exit poverty each year, those households that are poor for more than one
year have a lower probability to exit.
Thus, there are indications that there may be a negative effect from high inequality to low
growth, particularly if we consider unequal asset distribution. Countries with initially
severe inequality of consumption and land, may then be less successful at reducing
poverty, because a given growth rate leads to slower poverty reduction, at the same time as
the uneven distribution of land leads to slower growth. However, it is not easy to
generalize about the impact of a change in the pattern of distribution upon growth. The
impact will depend on the political and social context, and the method by which the
distribution of assets is adjusted.
5. Economic policies and pro-poor growth strategies
So far, we have looked at the interlinkages between growth, income distribution, and
poverty. An important question that follows is whether there are any particular
development strategies, or specific policies, that would simultaneously lead to high and
sustained growth rates, equitable distribution, and a rapid reduction of poverty. While at
least some of the evidence suggests that countries with more equal distribution grow more
quickly, it is also true that economic policy can compensate for inferior initial income
distribution. Lal and Myint (1996), studying growth, inequality, and poverty, found that
experiences vary a lot across countries, and that differences in performance are largely due
to different policy choices.7
Understanding the policies and development strategies of those countries that have
succeeded in reducing poverty substantially can provide some guidance for other countries.
Among the strategic elements that contributed to reduced poverty are: an outward-oriented
strategy of export-led growth, based on labour-intensive manufacturing; agricultural and
rural development at an early stage, with encouragement of new technologies; investment
in physical infrastructure and human capital; efficient institutions that provide the right set
of incentives to farmers and entrepreneurs; and social policies to promote health,
6 For a review on studies using panel data sets see Baulch and Hoddinott (2000). See Bigsten, Kronlid, and
Makkonen (2000) for evidence on income mobility in urban Ethiopia.
7 There has been extensive debates about the impact of structural adjustment programmes on poverty.
Demery and Squire (1996) argue that countries where policy reforms were implemented saw a decline in
poverty, while those where adjustment was delayed or reversed, the situation improved only marginally or
deteriorated without adjustment. Dorosh and Sahn (1998) argue that availability of donor funds has been
crucial for good results. Ali (1996, 1998) argues that the results of adjustment efforts on poverty are very
mixed. For a synthesis of country case studies evaluating adjustment policies and the impact on income
distribution, see Bourguignon and Morrison (1992), See also Kayizzi-Mugerwa and Levin (1996) and Levin
(1998) for a review of the experience of Sub-Saharan Africa.10
education, and social capital, as well as safety nets to protect the poor; improved access to
capital through better functioning credit markets, and a more equal distribution of assets
(Stewart, 2000, Thorbecke, 1999; Asian Development Bank, 1999; World Bank, 1999,
Goudie and Ladd, 1999).
A major challenge is to find combinations of instruments that will deliver both growth and
equity. While there are few studies analysing these issues, Lundberg and Squire (1999)
argue that financial depth, openness, and land distribution emerge as policies that
consistently spur growth. With the possible exception of openness, these policies also
benefit equality.
5.1. The choice of growth sectors
Even if economic growth is necessary to reduce poverty, the orientation of the growth
process is also important. A central question is what sectors should be given priority in a
poverty oriented growth strategy. The dual economy models of Lewis (1954) and Fei and
Ranis (1964) provided a first attempt to understand the role of inter-sectoral linkages,
which have been considered important when formulating development strategies.8 In the
1960s and 1970s, those strategies were focused on the expansion of industrial activities, in
order to increase demand for agricultural products. Most developing countries increased
trade barriers to protect the development of the domestic industry. Some countries,
primarily in Asia, managed to develop a competitive industry and were able to reduce
protection. One important explanation to this success was that they had undertaken land
reforms and that the agricultural sector was relatively well developed. The results in Africa
were poor. The import substitution policy did not lead to the creation of an internationally
competitive industry and it turned out to have a devastating effect on agricultural
production Through high trade barriers the agricultural production was taxed and the
farmers were forced to sell their goods at artificially low prices and agricultural production
stagnated. This did not only affect export revenues but also employment and poverty, both
in urban and rural areas. Since incomes in agriculture deteriorated, people moved to town
in search of jobs, but the majority ended up in the informal sector or in open
unemployment. This development meant that poverty increased both in town and in the
countryside.
However, a shift in emphasis took place in the 1980s, when economic reform programmes
were introduced. It was now argued that incentives supporting the agricultural sector were
necessary to increase agricultural production end reduce poverty in the rural areas. It was
necessary to increase producer prices, but further reforms of the rural environment have
turned out to be necessary to increase growth in agriculture in a sustainable way. Increased
agricultural production would in turn support domestic industry. Thus, while earlier
periods focused on backward linkages, the focus today is as much on forward linkages
(Bigsten and Collier, 1996).
8 Traditionally, intersectoral linkages are thought of as being synonymous with increased demand for
intermediate goods when production of the basic good increases (backward linkages), or with cheapening of
production when events in the sector in question cheapen another’s input (forward linkages) (Delgado et al.,
1999)11
Although those earlier models took a too simplistic view of various aspects of dualism,
renewed interest in the area has provided some interesting developments.9 For example,
Thorbecke and Stiefel (1999) expand the standard dualistic framework into a dual-dual
framework, which distinguishes modern (formal) and informal sector activities in both
urban and rural areas. With this framework, they show that population shifts between
socio-economic groups are an important factor in explaining changes in poverty.
In an extended dualistic framework, Bourguignon and Morrison (1998) found that the
extent of economic dualism is a major factor explaining differences in income distribution
across developing countries: Increased agricultural growth is the most efficient way of
reducing inequality and poverty. Results from India, obtained by following the evolution of
poverty through 35 household surveys undertaken between 1951 and 1991, also show that
agricultural growth mattered more than manufacturing growth for poverty reduction
(Ravallion and Datt, 1996). Mellor (1999) also argues that, even if manufacturing growth
is more important for overall growth, agricultural growth is more important for
employment growth and poverty reduction.
Analyses of linkages have generally focused on the production side of the economy.
However, some recent studies have of rural economies suggest that the primary
intersectoral linkages are to be found on the consumption side. They will thus depend on
how poor rural people spend increments in income (Delgado et al., 1998). Still, more
attention needs to be paid to inter-sectoral dynamics, especially in Sub-Saharan African
economies (Blunch and Verner, 1999).
5.2. The role of the public sector
A policy of redistribution is politically complicated. Asset redistribution may have costs in
terms of lost growth, so that there is an equity/growth trade-off. This could arise from
efficiency and output losses from one-off redistribution, or through the impact on
investment incentives. Redistribution therefore inevitably raises complex questions of
political, social and economic importance. As a result, governments may prefer a less
dirigiste approach and instead use changes in tax policies and public expenditures. They
must then try to achieve a balance between measures having immediate effects on poverty
and measures supporting processes that bring continuing and sustainable poverty
alleviation in the longer term.
Although many countries have had the intention of allocating expenditures towards
activities, which would reduce inequalities and poverty, they have often failed. One reason
for the disappointing results is the failure to link policy, planning, and budgeting. In many
countries, policy making, planning, and budgeting take place independently of each other.
Planning is often confined to investment activities, which in many less developed countries
refers to a series of donor-funded projects. Capital expenditures are thus already largely
accounted for through the planning process, and large portions of recurrent expenditures
are simply recommitted to the wage bill. For this reason, annual budgeting is reduced to
allocating resources thinly across donor- and domestically-funded ‘investment’ projects,
and to the non-wage portion of the recurrent budget.
9 The traditional models of dualism focused on the difference between modern (formal) industry and
traditional (informal) agriculture.12
In the absence of effective decision making processes, policy making and planning are also
disconnected from each other as well as from budgeting, and they are not constrained by
resource availability or by strategic priorities. Overall, this may lead to a massive
mismatch, between what is promised through government policies, and what is affordable.
The annual budgeting process, therefore, becomes more about scrambling to keep things
afloat, rather than allocating resources on the basis of clear policy choices to achieve
strategic objectives. It is therefore vital to reform the public sector as well as the forms of
foreign aid.
A tool that is now widely used in less developed countries, and also in some industrialized
countries, is the medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) within which ministers and
line ministries are provided with greater responsibility for resource allocation decisions and
resource use. The MTEF consists of a top-down resource envelope, a bottom-up estimation
of the current and medium term costs of existing policy, and, ultimately, the matching of
these costs with available resources. The matching of costs should normally occur in the
context of the annual budget process, which should focus on the need for policy change to
reflect changing macroeconomic conditions, as well as on changes in strategic priorities of
the government. The MTEF provides an efficient tool for achieving a more efficient use of
public resources.
The efficiency and composition of public expenditures are critical determinants of growth
and poverty. When undertaking fiscal reforms one may distinguish three types of impact
from reallocation of public expenditures. First, when relative prices and factor-incomes
change, income distribution and poverty will change. Second, the composition of
government expenditures affects sectoral productivity, and hence labour demand and
household income. Third, changes in the supply of public services, such as health care and
education have an impact on household’s possibilities to acquire human capital.
With regard to changes in relative prices and factor incomes following reduced
government recurrent expenditures, it is mainly urban households that are hurt, due to the
urban bias of government employment. Quite often rural households benefited from the
resulting changes in relative prices (Dorosh et al., 1996, Dorosh, 1996, and Levin, 1998).
However, in a number of countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, political constraints
induced governments to reduce capital expenditures, rather than laying off public
employees. While protecting urban households from a short term income loss, this had a
long term negative impact on the rural poor. For example, in the case of Ghana, when
government investment in agriculture and rural infrastructure declined, there were negative
long term effects on production. Thus, even if the rural population benefits from a real
depreciation of the exchange rate in the short run, these gains are eroded in the longer term
if public investment is not kept at a reasonable level (Dorosh and Lundberg, 1996).
Investment is one of the major determinants of economic growth in developing countries.
However, government interventions which are normally considered productive could
become unproductive, if there is an excessive amount of them. In particular, capital
expenditures, often thought to be the key component of development, have been excessive
in some developing countries, rendering them unproductive at the margin (Devarajan et.
al., 1996). This seems to have been the case in Tanzania. The evidence points to a negative
relationship between public investment expenditure and economic growth for the period
1965-96 (Kweka and Morrisey, 2000). Thus, a shake out of unproductive government
investments could raise the average productivity of investment. It is also true, however,13
that an excessive shake-out could have the effect of lowering the productivity of private
investment (Toye, 2000). For example, poor infrastructure and deficient public services in
Uganda significantly reduced investments of private firms (Reinikka and Svensson, 2000). In
Cameroon, as public investment was squeezed, and in particular infrastructural and
agricultural services, there was a negative impact on agricultural activities and the rural poor.
The policy implications is that if a substantial share of the private sector's costs are due to the
poorly functioning public sector, private sector response to economic reform is likely to
remain limited.
A reallocation of government expenditures may also impact on the supply of health and
education services, though this does not necessarily hurt the poor. Lloyd-Sherlock (2000)
argues that the scale, and general allocation patterns, of public social spending in Latin
America are not benefiting the poor. Despite the high level of spending, large sections of
low-income groups are excluded from many areas of public welfare. The effects of
entitlement restrictions are reinforced by severe problems of access and quality for
supposedly universal services. Empirical results from a number of African countries also
show that spending on social services, such as health care and education, is not well
targeted to the poorest households (Castro-Leal et. al, 1999, Sahn and Younger, 1999).
Subsidies to primary education are an exception, but they still appear inequitable, when
judged against the numbers of school-age children in the poorest groups. Thus, reallocation
of public expenditures is not sufficient; policies must be based on a sound understanding of
the factors that govern household decisions about health care and schooling, and of the
means by which subsidised services can lead to better outcomes for the poor.
There are many studies showing that health improves with higher per capita incomes. For
example, Kakwani (1993) investigated the relationship between income levels and welfare
indicators such as life expectancy at birth, literacy and the infant mortality rate. He found a
strong relationship, particularly in the poorer countries. Higher incomes improved the
indicators at a declining rate. Anand and Ravallion (1993) also found a significant
relationship between national income and life expectancy and mortality indicators.
Pritchett and Summers (1996) and Filmer and Pritchett (1997) also found a highly
significant effect from income to a range of health indicators.
However, there have been cases where structural adjustment loans led to growth without
having any significant positive effect on health indicators. The relationship is thus
complicated. But it seems that economic growth tends to improve the health of the
population, though the extent of the improvement depends on the character of the growth
process. A process that leads to reduced poverty, and improvements in the provision of
health services, will have a positive effect on health indicators. In addition, especially
when considering the irreversible effects of failing to make such investments (Appleton
and Teal, 1999), long term intergenerational effects of health care and education are an
important reason for promoting social sector investments, despite tight current fiscal
constraints.
Provision of public services in many countries is constrained by low levels of public
revenue, which could, in principle, be solved by higher levels of taxation. However, in
some countries, rapidly increased taxation might pose a severe constraint on private
investment, and thus might impact negatively on future growth, and hence on revenue
collection as well. In the case of Uganda, Chen and Reinikka (1999) suggest two reasons
why increased taxes reduced investment and future growth. First, the formal-enterprise14
sector typically represents a small share of output, but a high proportion of the effective
tax-base. Second, limited access to bank-financing and high interest rates, imply that
investment is largely financed by retained earnings.
Moreover, when governments resort to distortionary taxes, the manner in which the
government intervenes makes a big difference as to whether the intervention is beneficial
or not (Devarajan et al, 1998): Governments should always consider the option of
subsidisation before public provision, when intervening to correct an externality. Even
under the extreme assumption that the public sector is as efficient as the private sector, the
costs of financing public programmes through distortionary taxes may outweigh the
benefits of internalizing the positive externality. Further, government spending which in
one country might be growth-enhancing, could be growth-impeding in another, due to the
varying relative importance of both distortionary taxation and the externality being
internalized.
While the allocation of expenditure matter in terms of equity and poverty, a pro-poor
strategy would also entail measures targeted directly at the poor. When attempting to
alleviate poverty, much of the outcome depends on the type of targeting-mechanism
used.10 The objective in targeting is to ensure that a poor household's income is increased
up to the assumed poverty line. If the income of the poor was perfectly measurable and the
poor could be identified it would in principle be possible to design a perfectly targeted
policy. However, such perfect information is never available, and the costs of obtaining it
would, in any case, be high. An alternative is universal targeting, where information costs
are reduced to a minimum. The drawback with this type of targeting, however, is that it
would also benefit those who are not considered poor. Moreover, universal subsidies,
designed to benefit the whole population, have proven inefficient, distortionary, and fiscally
unsustainable. However, some leakage might be crucial for the political sustainability of the
programme (Gelbach and Prichett, 1997; de Donder and Hindricks, 1998).
Both perfect and universal targeting have high costs. In order to reduce information costs,
indicator targeting has been suggested as an approximation to perfect targeting. Indicator
targeting relies on making the transfer contingent, not on income or consumption, but on
some easily observable characteristic, such as sex, age, size of land holding, region of
residence, etc. For example, transfers can be targeted to specific socio-economic groups
containing large proportions of poor households (Thorbecke and Berrian, 1992).
Another approach is self-targeting, which is designed in such a way that only members of
the target group find it worthwhile to participate. For example, public employment
schemes use work requirements to help screen out the non-poor; subsidy programmes
support items that the poor consume, but not the rich; and other controls rely on waiting
time, stigma, and lower packaging-quality of goods and services, to dissuade usage by the
non-poor (de Walle, 1998). Self-targeted schemes also have the additional benefit of
reducing incentives towards corruption and favouritism. Ferreira et al. (1999) argue that a
key to the success of a self-targeted incentive scheme is the wage rate. A relatively low
wage rate can be an effective targeting devices.
10 On the principles of targeting, see Besley and Kanbur (1988), Hoddinott (1999), Thorbecke and Berrian
(1988) and van de Walle (1997).15
Other costs also need to be considered when a targeting scheme is implemented. Chia et al.
(1997) argue that two effects have been largely ignored in the traditional analysis: the first
related to leakages associated with the financing scheme, and the second related to the
impact of indirect effects, through changes in relative prices. For example, in the case of
Côte d'Ivoire, the amount of transfers in a universal targeting that would be thought to
eliminate poverty in a partial context, would in fact reduce total poverty by only 7
percentage points, when indirect effects are considered. Thus, neglecting indirect effects
can lead to the misallocation of resources directed at poverty alleviation (Thorbecke,
1992).
Summing up the above discussion, there are at least two important issues that need to be
considered: First, improved public service delivery is crucial in promoting economic
growth and reducing poverty. Second, tax policies need to be re-designed, in order to
satisfy an increasing demand for public services, while at the same time providing an
enabling environment for private sector development.
5.3 Pro-poor growth and human capital
Human-capital accumulation has been an important factor in accounting for differences in
growth rates and distribution across countries. Investing in education has been emphasised
in the development literature since the early 1970s. Although an extensive literature has
developed on the effects of the expansion of education on growth, relatively little is known
on its effects on the distribution on income. It might be the case that a sudden large
increase in the supply of medium-skilled workers, say with lower secondary education,
reduces the relative wage rate of that class of workers. This has, for example, happened in
slow growing Kenya (Appleton, Bigsten and Manda, 1999). To avoid such an outcome, the
increase in the supply of educated workers must be matched by an increase in labour
demand, which in turn will depend on economic growth.
A change in the educational structure of a population necessarily induces changes in many
dimensions of economic and social behaviour, each of which might have powerful
secondary effects on growth, distribution and poverty. Labour force participation,
household formation, migration, and fertility are all domains where education plays a
major role, and where changes are likely to affect the development path of the economy.
Thus, there is a dynamic, and intergenerational, dimension in the effects of education that
must be taken into account.
Bourguignon et al. (1998) provide an innovative methodological framework that links
observed changes in the distribution of individual income and earnings attributes to
changes in the socio-demographic structure of the population, in particular with respect to
education, to changes in Labour force participation and occupational choice behaviour, and
finally to changes in the structure of individual earnings as a result of changes in the labour
market.
Analysis of the Taiwanese experience (Bourguignon, Fourier and Gurgand, 1998) provides
several important insights. Several factors affected the distribution of income, but they
tended to offset each other. First, increased returns to schooling occurred despite a
dramatic growth in the supply of educated workers, and this contributed to increased
inequality. This effect, however, was more than offset by other tendencies, such as a
change in participation behaviour and the expansion of education, which equalized the16
distribution of schooling, and therefore of earnings. Altogether, this produced a significant
drop in inequality of individual earnings.
Brazil, which has gone through substantial structural changes,11 is another interesting case,
the population grew by 47 percent between 1976 and 1996, and became more urban.
Average education rose from 3.2 to 5.3 years of schooling. The sectoral composition of the
labour force changed, away from agriculture and manufacturing, towards services. The
degree of formalisation of the labour force declined substantially: the proportion of formal
workers was almost halved, from just under 60 percent to just over 30 percent of all
workers. And yet, despite the macroeconomic turmoil and continuing structural changes,
little changed in Brazilian income distribution between 1976 and 1996.
The Brazilian experience resembles the Taiwanese case study, with distributional stability
again belying a number of powerful, and often countervailing, changes: returns to
education in the labour markets; the distribution of educational endowments in the
population; the pattern of occupational choices; and the demographic structure resulting
from household fertility choices.
Two particular puzzles in the evolution of Brazil’s urban income distribution are: (1) the
combination of growth in mean incomes and stable or slightly declining inequality, on the
one hand, and rising extreme poverty on the other; and (2) what explains the stability in
inequality and poverty, in the face of declining rates of return to schooling and experience?
Results from micro-modelling analysis show that the first puzzle seems to have been
caused by outcomes related to participation decisions and occupational choices, in
combination with declines in the labour market returns to education and experience. The
second puzzle seems to be a result of hard climbs along a slippery slope. Individuals had to
gain an average of two years of schooling, and substantially reduce fertility, in order to
counteract falling returns in both the formal labour market and self-employment. The
results of these studies demonstrates clearly that the distributional outcome is a result of a
complex of often countervailing forces.
5.4 Policy measures to reduce risk and income volatility
The recent World Development Report (World Bank, 2000) extends the concept of poverty
beyond income and consumption plus education and health, to include risk and
vulnerability, as well as voicelessness and powerlessness. It is not necessarily the case that
shocks affect the poor disproportionately, but it is clearly the case that they are more
vulnerable, since their economic margin is slim. Vulnerability and insecurity are dynamic
concepts. The poor are often exposed to highly fluctuating incomes, and, particularly, in
rural areas, it is common for households to move in and out of poverty (Dercon, 2000 and
World Bank, 2000). Poor households are susceptible to a wide range of risks, some which
are idiosyncratic, such as illness, while others are common, such as natural disasters. As a
result, poor households may adopt production plans or employment strategies to reduce
their exposure to the risk, even if this entails lower average income.12 Poor households
11 This discussion draws on Ferreira and de Barros (1999).
12 For example, it has been found that households which are more vulnerable to income shocks devote a
smaller share of their land to risky high-yielding varieties, compared to households with better access to
coping mechanisms (Morduch, 1990).17
may also try to smooth consumption by creating buffer stocks, withdrawing children from
school, and developing credit and insurance arrangements. Social networks also help
provide informal insurance.
The policy approach that is outlined in WDR 2000 goes somewhat beyond the approach
outlined in the 1990 WDR, putting increased emphasis on empowerment and security. The
concept of social capital is used to describe the ability of individuals to secure benefits as a
result of membership in social networks or other social structures. The general concern is
that the poor have considerable local bonding social capital and some bridging social
capital, while they have little of what is called linking social capital, that is, linkages to
society outside the local community. This makes them very vulnerable to natural disasters
and economic shocks, since geographically confined networks provide little protection
against this type of shocks. Informal institutions are very important in helping households
to manage risk and vulnerability, but the poor often lack access to the broader range of
formal networks, which are needed to sustain a more complex interchange with society at
large.
Given the high vulnerability of a large part of the population, Collier and Gunning (1999)
argue that this provides some explanation for low growth in both rural and urban areas in
Africa. Moreover, economic reforms, which in the long-run may provide more sustainable
livelihoods with higher returns, may in the short-run cause households serious problems of
adjustment, especially if entry into new activities is costly and is perceived as risky
(Dercon, 1999). Consequently, actions that reduce risk and income-volatility, or that
provide insurance against risk would help the poor to take advantage of poverty-reducing
strategies. Experience suggests that a combination of public-works programmes, group-
lending schemes, subsidised where necessary, and simple deposit schemes, offers some
support in dealing with these issues (Kanbur and Squire, 1999). Additional measures in
reducing risk and vulnerability are for example; creating opportunities for wage
employment both by raising agricultural productivity among small and marginal farmers;
and by increasing opportunities for self-employment. Microfinance is particularly relevant
for increasing the productivity of self-employment in the informal sector of the economy.
It is well documented that, for many micro-entrepreneurs, lack of access to financial
services is a critical constraint to the establishment or expansion of viable micro
enterprises. Microfinance may also enable small and marginal farmers to purchase the
inputs they need to increase their productivity, as well as financing a range of activities
adding value to agricultural output and in the rural off-farm economy. Access to savings
facilities also plays a key part in enabling the poor to smooth their consumption
expenditures, and in financing investments, which improve productivity in agriculture and
other economic activities.
Rapid and sustainable poverty reduction depends upon the interaction of a wide range of
policy measures. The potential for financial development as an instrument of economic
management and of poverty reduction, will be unfulfilled so long as conventional financial
institutions are reluctant to expand their activities beyond their traditional borrowers.
Microfinance institutions can play an important role in filling this gap, and possibly also, in
the longer term help to reduce imperfections in the market, improving access to credit for
poor households in both urban and rural areas. However, many programmes that have been
successful in reaching the poor are still not financially sustainable. Whether subsidies used
for administrative costs of programmes with significant poverty-focused outreach are18
better than subsidies in other areas is an empirical issue, which needs a careful case-by-
case evaluation.
6. Conclusion
We noted initially that global poverty is still extensive, but that the proportion living in
poverty as well as the absolute number declined substantially over a period up to the recent
Asia crisis, which again increased poverty in many countries. We also noted that the gap in
incomes between the richest and the poorest countries has increased in recent decades. We
then reviewed the literature on the determinants of economic growth. This depends on the
accumulation of physical and human capital, efficiency in resource allocation, and the
acquisition and application of modern technology. There is, however, evidence showing
that it is the social infrastructure that determines the underlying levels of productivity.
The evidence reviewed in this study show that countries that have been successful in terms
of economic growth are also very likely to have been successful in reducing poverty. How
strong a poverty-reducing effect growth has, depends on what happens to income
distribution; there is no constant relationship between growth and changes in inequality.
There are differences between countries with different development strategies, and one
would certainly prefer strategies with more favourable distributional outcomes, if they
produced the same growth. Countries that have combined rapid growth with improved
income distribution, have reduced poverty the fastest. However, when policies aimed at
equity have had a negative side-effect on growth, the poverty reduction impact has been
limited or even negative. Thus, there may be a conflict between short term distributional
measures and immediate poverty reduction on the one hand, and long term growth-
supporting measures and long term poverty reduction, on the other. But there may also be
win-win situations, where a policy for equity has a beneficial effect on growth. Typically,
those policies have built up the assets of the poor, and helped increase the demand for
those assets. This has meant, for example, expansion of education (building up assets), and
measures that increase the relative prices of agricultural commodities and the wages of
unskilled labour (increasing demand). Along with measures to secure long term growth of
the incomes of the poor, there should also be transfer schemes that help households to cope
with risk, which is high for many poor groups. One should try to create schemes that can
reduce risk without having high costs in terms of reduced growth.
The main point must still be that, without growth in per capita incomes, poverty will persist
in poor countries. Governments intent on poverty reduction must therefore create an
environment that is conducive to growth. This means microeconomic policy aimed at
creating well-functioning markets, macroeconomic policy aimed at stability, and openness
towards the rest of the world. Government has to take responsibility for building up human
capital via education, and for the creation of a growth enhancing social infrastructure. For
all these efforts to be effective, the government must develop good institutions, and
provide good governance. The way in which the interaction between civil society and the
government is played out will have major implications for the growth outcome.
Understanding the nature of domestic politics is thus a key to successful economic reform.
Something that frequently appears in analyses of the Asian success stories is the notion of
‘shared growth’, which suggests that, in order to participate actively, the mass of the
population must see the benefits of growth. However, it is not only the average person who
must be included, but the ruling elite must also allow competing groups to progress, as well19
as allowing new competitors to enter the political arena. For shared growth to come about,
there is need for a bureaucracy of high quality, which is sufficiently insulated from the
various pressure groups. This has not as yet appeared in most of Africa.
Poverty can be reduced if there is sufficient economic growth. Growth can be substantial if
the policy and institutional environment is right. The low growth rates that characterise
Africa are not inevitable. But some aspects of the environment are hard to change, and
some politicians may be unwilling to change them. It is therefore largely in the social and
political arenas that poverty reduction results will be determined.
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